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Abstract
The Low Pay Commission is the institution created in 1997 to introduce Britain’s first
National Minimum Wage. The paper places the Commission in historical perspective
and provides a summary assessment of the initial impact of the Minimum Wage. It
describes and analyses the development of the Commission and its concerns, conduct
and advice. Central to its performance has been its independent, ‘social partnership’
constitution. The conclusion emphasises the centrality of the Commission’s use of
widespread consultation and academic research, and the unique asset of firm
enforcement of the National Minimum Wage by HM Revenue and Customs.
Keywords: minimum wage; social partnership; labour market regulation
JEL Classification: I3, J3, J8, K3, L5
                                                
1
 This is a draft chapter for The Changing Institutional Face of UK Employment Relations,
forthcoming, edited by L. Dickens and A. Neal, Kluwer.
2
 The author is grateful for the comments of fellow Commissioners, past and present, the Secretariat,
and Jon Clark. All opinions expressed and any factual errors are his sole responsibility.
2The Low Pay Commission appears to have settled into the institutional landscape of
the British labour market remarkably smoothly. Created in the immediate wake of the
‘New’ Labour victory at the 1997 election, the single purpose of the Commission has
been to advise on the introduction and maintenance of a National Minimum Wage.
The political anticipation of this had been highly contentious. But the issue dropped
out of controversy almost as soon as the Wage was implemented. Despite the fact that
the Low Pay Commission manages what is arguably Britain’s most intrusive labour
market intervention, it has come to do this with little public criticism. A newspaper
headline that had greeted the introduction of the Wage in 1999 continues to apply:
‘Minimum Wage; minimum fuss’.
This paper discusses the context and conduct of the Low Pay Commission. Other
accounts are available of the early life of the Commission and of the National
Minimum Wage.3 This focuses on the, at time of writing in 2005, comparatively
mature operation of the Commission, and discusses the ways in which it has come to
deal with an ever-changing labour market. In particular, it discusses how a very self-
consciously ‘social partnership’ institution has developed its own way of operating,
with an ‘arm’s length’ relationship with government. The health warning is that the
paper is written by a founding member of the Commission; it can make no claims to
objectivity.
Background
There is nothing new about statutory regulation of wages in Britain. For centuries
magistrates had been empowered to fix the wages of certain occupations. This had
petered out by the early 19th century. But the years that followed were ones of rapid
economic change and of new forms of exploitation. It became increasingly evident
that, when there is almost unlimited supply of labour, unregulated wages could be
driven down to levels that supported neither common decency nor minimal nutrition.
By the end of the 19th century, Charles Booth estimated that over a third of school age
children in London were living below what he calculated to be the physically and
nutritionally necessary poverty line. Encouraged by the experience of the Australian
state of Victoria, pressure grew to tackle the problem directly through statutory
minimum wages. In 1909 Winston Churchill brought in his Trade Boards Act,
permitting minima to be established on a national but sectoral basis.4 Renamed
‘wages councils’ in 1945, these comprised equal numbers of employer and worker
representatives, with a small number of ‘independents’ to break deadlocks and
represent wider interests.5 The councils had a small inspectorate with authority to
enforce their wages orders, the breaching of which was a criminal offence.
At their peak in 1953 there were 66 wages councils providing a safety net for around
3.5 million employees - about 17 per cent of the employed workforce - and supported
by a couple of hundred inspectors. They covered sectors ranging from the more
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3obvious such as Road Haulage, Baking, and Retail Food Trades, to the more esoteric
concerned with, for example, Drift Nets Mending, Corsets, and Ostrich and Fancy
Feathers and Artificial Flowers. But for various reasons, not the least being trade
union suspicions that statutory minimum wages undermined collective bargaining, the
system went into decline. By 1993, when John Major’s government abolished all but
the Agricultural Wages Board, the coverage was no more than 2.5 million employees.
Some sectors that were emerging with large numbers of often highly vulnerable
workers, such as industrial cleaning, security, and care homes, were not covered at all.
Even for those that were covered, the average ‘bite’ of the wages councils’ statutory
rates, expressed as a percentage of sectoral average earnings, had fallen from 50 per
cent in 1980 to 43 per cent in 1993. There was evidence of substantial underpayment,
perhaps partly because there were derisory penalties in the very rare event of
prosecutions.6
In 1974, contrary to prevailing trade union opinion, dissatisfaction with this position
developed in the public service union NUPE, with the publication of a carefully
argued case for what was called a National Minimum Wage by its authors, the general
secretary, Alan Fisher and research officer, Bernard Dix.7 But it was to take twenty
years before Rodney Bickerstaff (successor to Fisher as general secretary of the
expanded and renamed Unison) managed to get the proposal onto the Labour Party’s
electoral platform, with important backing from the M.P. Ian McCartney. Two
substantial changes had facilitated this acceptance. One was a greater awareness by a
weakened trade union movement that statutory minimum labour standards might
actually support, rather than undermine, the floor on which collective bargaining was
based. The second was the substantial recent increase in inequality in Britain. In
particular, as had been the case a hundred years earlier, there was growing concern
that there had been a sharp increase in the proportion of children growing up in
poverty.
There have been many factors contributing to the rising inequality of pay in Britain
since around 1980. Some are global changes, such as the declining relative demand
for less skilled labour: as a result of technological change, and as a result of the
increased openness, and increased size, of the international economy. Some are more
particular to Britain, such as the decline in trade union membership, the contraction in
the coverage of collective agreements, and the abolition of wages councils. Chart 1
shows how the wages of British employees over 22 years of age fared across the pay
distribution in the five years 1992 to 1997, running up to the introduction of the
National Minimum Wage.89 It divides the whole employed workforce into
hundredths, ranked from the lowest paid to the highest paid, and shows the extent to
which the average pay increases received by each of those hundredths differs from the
average pay increase of the middle, fiftieth one. It is apparent that the lower a
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4worker’s earnings were, the poorer the pay increases they received over the five-year
period – and that the reverse applied for the relatively well-paid. The bottom and top
five or so per cent had the most extreme experience of this.
Chart 1 -  Relative changes in pay by percentile, 1992 - 1997.  
Percentage change against the median of  gross hourly earnings excluding overtime by 
percentile, employees 22 and over  unaffected by absence.  (Source: LPC / ONS estimates 
from NES)
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The implications for child poverty have been substantial. The percentage of children
living in households with incomes below 50 per cent of mean income (before housing
costs), which had remained fairly steady at around 10 per cent throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, rose sharply to above 25 per cent by the late 1990s.10 Child poverty in
Britain, expressed in these relative terms, had become worse than at any time since, at
least, the Second World War. Politically this was seen to be important because a
major policy objective of Gordon Brown’s Chancellorship was the reduction of the
many adverse social and economic consequences of child poverty.
 
 
The government also had a strong financial incentive. As the preceding Conservative
administration had discovered, the payment of in-work benefits to working parents on
low pay is necessary both to mitigate the effects of child poverty and to encourage
parents to move into work who might otherwise become dependent on out-of-work
benefits. If, however, there is no floor to wages, there are many employers who are
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5only too happy to offer very low rates of pay and to encourage their employees to
maximise their in-work benefits payments. The consequences of the Exchequer in
effect subsidising unscrupulous employers as a result of this behaviour were
becoming extremely expensive. Between 1988 and 1997 the number of families on in-
work benefits rose from around 50,000 to 700,000 and the annual cost to the
Exchequer from £200 million to £2,100 million. A statutory minimum wage would
force employers to shoulder some of the cost of propping up the finances of low
income families.
 
 The Wage settles in
 The Low Pay Commission had pitched its recommendation of the initial level of the
National Minimum Wage cautiously, and on the basis of a variety of sources of
information, all of which were very imperfect. There were unavoidably contentious
projections of what might have been prevailing rates of wages councils, had they not
been abolished in 1993. There was the experience of other countries in terms of the
relative position in their wage distributions of their own statutory minimum wages -
these spanned an unhelpfully wide range. There were data on rates actually paid in the
key low wage sectors. Important, if not disinterested, were the views of the trade
associations of the most affected sectors on what was affordable. There were also
economic modellers’ estimates of the effect of different rates on pay differentials and
on the macro-economy, all highly dependent upon their models’ unavoidably heroic
assumptions.
 
 There were also two well-established national sample pay surveys. Unfortunately, for
this purpose, they turned out to be seriously flawed. The multi-purpose door-step
interviews of individual citizens used by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) proved to be
an unreliable source of information both on what people earned and, as important
from the point of view of estimating hourly rates, on the number of hours they
worked. The LFS tended to underestimate hourly wages. The New Earnings Survey
(NES), on the other hand, conceived in the 1960s to monitor incomes policies, used
unimpeachable pay-roll data from employers, but was defective in failing to pick up
many employees who were not earning enough in a week to meet the threshold which
triggers Pay As You Earn income tax payments. These were typically just those low-
paid, part-time workers for whom the Minimum Wage was intended. The result was
two surveys whose estimates of the incidence of low pay differed substantially. This
mattered a great deal since, in the relevant part of the hourly wage distribution, 10p
difference encompassed around a quarter of a million employees. The Office of
National Statistics tackled the problem robustly. As a stop-gap it produced a
compromise estimate. But by 2004 it was ready to improve the NES radically,
replacing it with the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). This increased
the coverage of the survey of employers and dealt with missing data by imputation
and weighting. The bottom end of the labour market will always be characterised by
murkiness - cash in hand payments, misrecording of hours, and scrappy records
ensure that - but at least those statistics that are available are now providing a more
reliable guide.
 
6 
Chart 2 - Relative changes in pay by percentile 1998-2003
 Percentage change against the median of gross hourly earnings excluding overtime by 
percentile, all employees 22 and over unaffected by absence  
(source LPC/ONS from NES)
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 The initial impact of the National Minimum Wage for the low paid has been
substantial. Chart 2 indicates, again by percentile, how pay rises differed from the
median over the five years up to 2003, after the initial impact of the Wage. The
contrast with Chart 1 is notable. Although the top percentiles have continued to do
relatively well, those at the very bottom have seen their relative experience
transformed. For the lowest ten or so per cent, pay rises have been substantially better
than the median. Although there have been other changes in the context of low pay,
this transformation is likely to be substantially attributable to the National Minimum
Wage. It is also evident that the relative improvement is quite tightly confined to the
lowest percentiles, which implies that there has not been a substantial ‘knock-on’
effect on pay differentials, which had been an early concern.
 
 There have also been substantial consequences for gender equality, since women have
been the main beneficiaries of the Minimum Wage. If we take the lowest decile,
women’s hourly pay as a percentage of men’s (aged 22 and over) rose from 80 per
cent in 1998 to 85 per cent in 2004. While other factors will have contributed to this,
the Commission’s own analysis concluded that the Minimum Wage ‘…has exerted a
major influence in narrowing the pay gap at the lower end of the earnings
distribution.’11 In summary, the Minimum Wage thus far appears to have been
working well in the direction intended.
 
 The law and its enforcement
 How are the institutions underpinning the Wage settling in? Let us start with the 1998
National Minimum Wage Act. This was strong legislation, vastly more so than
previous measures supporting wages councils. It had, for example, a broad definition
of eligible workers, a requirement of reversal of proof on employers, and it threatened
those in breach with substantial penalties. There have been some minor adjustments to
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7the initial legislation, to cover loopholes and inadequate definitions. For example,
regulations have been tightened on the payment of arrears by offending employers to
workers no longer in employment, as have those concerning the complex matter of
piecework pay. The Commission has called for more financially penal treatment of
errant employers who delay reparation payments to employees they have been caught
under-paying. But the general impression is that the legislation is felt by most of those
who are affected by it to be effective and appropriate.
 
 The agency responsible for Minimum Wage enforcement, what is now called HM
Revenue and Customs, has entered into its new role with characteristic investigative
energy. In 2002-03, for example, the Revenue’s Helpline received around 53,000
enquiries, carried out about 6000 compliance investigations (many initiated
proactively), as a result of which 24 cases were heard by an employment tribunal, and
£3.6 million in wage arrears were identified12. The Revenue’s experience with small
employers who take chances on tax matters has proved to be valuable.
 
 This is not to say that the Act has never been breached. Far from it. The black
economy, cash payment, under-recording of hours worked and collusive illegal
behaviour by employers and employees remain very much a feature of the low paid
end of the labour market. At time of writing, no criminal prosecutions had been
pursued. But, in July 2005, Gerry Sutcliffe, the junior minister responsible, announced
that there would a new policy under which particular sectors (initially hairdressing)
would be targeted for enforcement and that, separately, efforts would be made ‘…to
identify cases with the aim of identifying a small number of employers for
prosecution’.13 It was felt that some more conspicuous enforcement was called for,
pour encourager les autres. However imperfect the enforcement process, it is hard to
imagine that it could be pursued with more investigative experience, or command
more employer respect, than this policing by the Revenue.
 
 The role of the Commission
 If one test of the durability of an institution is its capacity to function effectively
despite changes in personnel, then that test has so far been passed. The full-time
secretariat has seen, in normal Civil Service style, fairly continuous staff turnover
without any deterioration of the high quality of support. In 2005, none of the nine
secretariat had been with the Commission for more than three years and the Secretary
was the fifth in post. Of the nine Commissioners, there had been seven departures and
only four of the original members were still present in mid-2005. Adair (now Lord)
Turner had replaced Sir George Bain as Chair in 2002. But, so far as these things can
be judged, the ethos and sense of common cause among Commissioners seems
unchanged after eight years.
 
 It is, perhaps, surprising, that this relatively small body should be able to cope with
fairly frequent changes in personnel without changing its character and conduct. Part
of the explanation probably lies in its very deliberate ‘social partnership’ construction,
with broadly implied roles and ‘balance’. There is an implicit expectation that the
distinctive employer and trade union backgrounds of six Commissioners will
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8sometimes be evident when it comes to asking awkward questions and testing weak
arguments. If they are not to challenge arguments on behalf of their notional
constituents, who will? Similarly, the three independents are expected, at least, to
ensure that research and its use are rigorous. But all Commissioners act as individuals,
drawing on their background experience but not mandated in any way by the
organisations they come from. Certainly this is how they behave. Individual positions
adopted in arguments on the many issues that come before the Commission are rarely
clearly role-related, and it is only on the periodic debate on the recommended level of
the Minimum Wage that there is predictable polarisation. Although straw polls
sometimes help move discussions along, decisions of the Commission have always
been unanimous.
 
 The Commission’s work has come to be geared every two years around a major
report, which assesses the recent impact of the Minimum Wage and makes a
recommendation for the next two years. Usually there has been an interim report on a
particular issue – in 2004 it was concerned with the recommendation that there should
be a statutory rate for 16 and 17 year olds. As will be discussed below, so far there has
been a steady stream of new policy issues, reflecting changes in the labour market,
and also of matters raised by government and by particular interest groups. Each year
there have been up to ten half-day Commission meetings, one or two over-night
‘retreats’, and sometimes ad hoc meetings or conferences on research. Each year there
have been up to ten consultative trips to different parts of the U.K. – typically with
three Commissioners and a couple of secretariat – to meet people from three or four
different affected sectors at their place of work to discuss their perceptions of current
Commission concerns. Finally, as part of the process of preparing for the major
reports it has been necessary to have formal hearings in London with the main interest
groups.
 
 The most demanding task facing the Commission is that of periodically agreeing on a
recommendation for the actual level of the Minimum Wage. As well as the evidence
that comes in from interested parties, and from commissioned research, the secretariat
carry out a substantial amount of their own investigation, analysis, consultation or
other background work that they and Commissioners consider might be relevant. This
leads up to the Commission occupying a country hotel for a weekend for structured
discussion of key issues. When the proposal of new rates is the main subject, these
‘retreats’ take the form of initial briefings followed by a series of short meetings both
as a whole Commission and in sub-groups. During these the Chair in effect plays the
role of an industrial relations mediator. Supported by the other two independents he
explores the priorities and options of the employer and union members and cajoles
them gradually into converging on an outcome everyone can live with. So far
Commissioners have emerged from these rate-fixing weekends in weary agreement,
but it has never been an easy process.
 
 The outcomes are set out in Table 1. All rates recommended by the Commission have
been accepted by the government, although the timing was altered somewhat in the
first couple of years. Two years’ recommendations have been made at a time, initially
to facilitate agreement within the Commission, but later in response to employer
requests for adequate notice of Minimum Wage changes. Thus 1999 and 2000 were
decided as a package, as were 2001 and 2002, 2003 and 2004, and, most recently,
2005 and 2006. The 2001 and 2002 recommendations were, as can be seen, quite
9heavily ‘front-loaded’, with that for 2001 being substantially larger than that in 2002,
but subsequently the loading has been more even.
 
 The initial level of the Wage was set cautiously, partly because of the uncertainties
already mentioned about the statistical facts, and also because the Commissioners
were aware that the initial shock of the Wage on employers in the unregulated labour
market of 1999 would be far greater than that of any subsequent increase. It would
never have made sense to fix a long-term rate in relative terms straight away. Both
finding an acceptable relative position and allowing the labour market to adjust to it
can only be gradual processes. But the Commission were determined that the Wage
should ‘make a difference’ and, with the exception of the increase in October 2002,
the recommended increases have been greater than increases in average earnings as a
whole. As a result, thus far the Minimum Wage has been gradually moving up the
national earnings distribution, thereby increasing the number of workers benefiting.
 
 Table 1 – Increases in National Minimum Wage, Average Earnings and Prices
 
Date of NMW
increase
NMW
adult rate
per hour
(workers
aged 22+)
Increase in
NMW
since
previous
NMW
setting
Increase in
average
earnings
index
since
previous
setting
Increase in
retail price
index
since
previous
setting
£ % % %
1 Apr 1999 3.60 - - -
1 Oct 2000 3.70 2.8 3.1 2.7
1 Oct 2001 4.10 10.8 4.3 2.3
1 Oct 2002 4.20 2.4 3.7 2.3
1 Oct 2003 4.50 7.1 3.6 2.7
1 Oct 2004 4.85 7.8 4.2 2.1
1 Oct 2005 5.05 4.1 n.a. n.a.
1 Oct 2006 5.35 5.9 n.a. n.a.
 
 What has determined these increases? Or rather, what have been the issues at the front
of Commissioners’ minds as they have edged towards agreement? From the start, the
dominant anxiety has been employment. At what position in the national wage
distribution might the Minimum Wage start to cause significant job loss, or frustrate
job creation? This has been, and continues to be, the central concern during
consultations and in the commissioning of research. It was also the prime issue in
deciding on the lower ‘Development Rate’ that was, with considerable internal
difficulty, agreed primarily for younger workers. The Commission recommended this
lower rate from the 18th to the 21st birthday, but the government has consistently
required it to be the 22nd birthday, justifying this variation in terms of vulnerability to
unemployment. Employability arose yet again as the main consideration when, in
2004, a minimum rate was recommended for 16- and 17-year-olds. Whatever other
issues enter the Commissioners’ internal debates, their prime constraint has always
been, and continues to be, anxiety about causing job loss.
 
 Considerations other than employment effects have waxed and waned in salience. At
the start, when some economic modellers predicted substantial knock-on effects, the
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potentially inflationary macro-economic impact of the Wage was an issue.
Commissioners had two meetings with the Monetary Policy Committee to explain
their reasoning on this. But in practice knock-on consequences for the macro-
economy proved to be insignificant. International comparisons seemed relevant at
first, but as the Wage settled in and experience of it made the Commission more
confident, these waned. Close comparison of aspects of statutory minimum wages of
different countries is, in any case, made difficult by their diverse labour market
institutions and data sources.
 
 The view that the Minimum Wage should reflect the income needs of workers, which
has dominated past minimum wage debates in some countries, and features in terms
of a ‘living wage’ in the arguments of some British pressure groups, has never
become a major issue for the Commission. This is largely because actual disposable
income is so highly determined by family circumstances and the tax and benefit
regime. The Commission has had research conducted on the impact of the wage on
net family income, but that has not been translatable into discussions of the Wage
level. Another concern that loomed large at first but has diminished in the light of
experience is whether the Wage might discourage investment in training, especially
for young people. The Commission’s informed judgement has been that, if anything,
having to pay people more may encourage rather than discourage employers to train
them, but that, in any case, Britain’s training inadequacies have deeper roots.
 
 Considerations that have become more significant as the Wage has settled in, and as
anxieties about adverse employment effects have not been realised, have been very
practical. Most important has been a concern that compressed differentials may
weaken incentives for those paid just above the Minimum Wage. Certainly many
employers have argued this with regard to their ability to reward skill, effort,
experience, and responsibility. Another emerging concern is enforcement. The higher
the Minimum Wage edges in relative terms, the greater the incentive for employers to
cheat in some way – by paying in cash ‘off the books’, or by under-recording working
time, and so on. Reflecting another source of concern, the Commission has
increasingly kept a keen eye on trends in profit levels, and in company start-ups and
bankruptcies. At time of writing, these have shown no adverse signals.
 
 The number of beneficiaries from the Minimum Wage is a question that has always
taxed the Commission, not least because it is a natural statistic-of-choice for
politicians. Initial estimates were substantially too high, largely because of the
problems with the LFS and NES already mentioned. But this does not mean that the
Commission ever had an initial target in terms of the number of beneficiaries. The
initial estimate was simply the number of beneficiaries implied by the flawed survey
statistics once the proposed cautious initial level of the Wage had been decided.
 
 As time has gone on it has become increasingly evident that any estimate of
beneficiaries is unavoidably subject to controversial assumptions. For example, it may
be that, in the absence of the Wage, the relative position of the low paid would have
continued to decline, as it had up to 1998. But how far and how fast? Then again,
many employers have got into the habit of anticipating the announcement of
Minimum Wage increases due in October by giving earlier increases according to
their normal pay round calendar. But the muted response to the relatively small
increase of October 2002 suggests that such anticipatory pay increases are, indeed,
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anticipatory, and would not have been as large without the announcement of the
forthcoming Wage. And although knock-on effects are evidently relatively limited,
employers undoubtedly raise pay of some employees who are already above the
Minimum Wage in order to preserve both internal and external differentials. Indeed,
there is good evidence that, for many employers in many industries (and not least the
Agricultural Wages Board), the Minimum Wage has become the driving force behind
increases in their lowest rates. In brief, any estimate of the number of beneficiaries is
unavoidably rough. But, in this spirit, a reasonable estimate might be that, if the Wage
were frozen in 2005, then within a year at very least one and a half million employees
would suffer a consequential deterioration in pay relative to all employees. Over a
longer period, because the Minimum Wage is being used as a guiding light much
more widely, the number would be substantially greater.
 
 Consultation
 The consultative visits, which had been essential to the process of initially defining
and then setting the level of the Wage, continue to be a crucial part of the
Commission’s functioning. It is rare that some new insight does not come from an
hour’s discussion at their place of work with people immediately involved with low
paid employment – whether they be concerned with domiciliary care, strawberry
picking, dry cleaning, corner shops, packing tights, caravan parks, catering, careers
advice, adventure holidays, sandwich making, infant nurseries, or whatever. These
people deal on a daily basis with the problem of managing, motivating, affording,
competing, and surviving with the Minimum Wage. They may not be statistically
representative, but their perceptions have the authority that comes from immediate
practical experience, and they are very ready to discuss them. For Commissioners, the
shared experience of the visits, and of trying to make sense of what they have seen
and heard (and sometimes smelled), continues to be important in generating shared
understandings and points of reference. It has become routine at the start of normal
Commission meetings to discuss any interesting issues raised by the most recent
consultative visits.
 
 In this way the Commission has been able to pick up on many labour market
developments and particular sectoral problems early. Commissioners were, for
example, meeting with gang-masters back in 1997, have talked to more subsequently,
and thus had a broad understanding of their role in the labour market long before
some gang-masters gained national, criminal notoriety in 2004. Another instance of
the visits providing early information has been that they have been yielding powerful
insights into the way in which new immigrants (legal and illegal), and more recently
those from the new EU member states, have been fitting in at the bottom of the labour
market.
 
 Consultative visits have been targeted to help the Commission to gain deeper
understanding on which to base their recommendations when new questions have
been raised by the Minimum Wage. One example was to do with therapeutic earnings
– that is, where people with some sort of disability are encouraged with small
incentive payments, when light work is considered to be conducive to their health or
recovery. How could such work be defined so that the therapeutic value of it could be
protected without denying potentially very vulnerable people the protections of the
statutory Minimum Wage? The Commission’s definition, derived from discussions
with carers and from visits to centres dedicated to the care and rehabilitation of people
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with learning difficulties, has in part been reflected in revisions to the Government’s
guidance notes on what constitutes work for Minimum Wage purposes.
 
 A second example arose from the inadequacy of the Minimum Wage regulations’
initial definition of piecework. These were, on the one hand, not robust enough to
help many manual home-workers, of whom it has been estimated there are up to a
million in the British economy, 90 per cent of them women and up to 50 per cent from
ethnic minority groups. But, on the other hand, many employers in the clothing
industry deemed the Minimum Wage’s application to piecework to be terminally
crippling to productivity because it denied adequate cash incentives. It took a series of
lively discussions with representatives of affected industries to establish the relevant
facts (one of which was that the domestic clothing industry needed far more for its
survival than a sharp incentive system for production workers) before a clearer and
more down-to-earth definition of a ‘fair piece rate’ entered the regulations.
 
 Quite apart from the information and understanding gained through consultative
visits, they provide political credibility to the whole data-gathering process. Pressure
groups such as trade associations, disability groups, and regional chambers of
commerce value the opportunity to have their more outspoken activists making their
case on their home ground. As a matter of policy, if people affected by the Minimum
Wage contact the Commission with an interesting new complaint or problem, an
effort is made to fit them into a forthcoming visit. It is partly for this reason that the
Commission makes an effort to cover most regions each year – it made, for example,
six separate consultative visits to Northern Ireland in its first eight years. It matters a
great deal to get out, and to be seen to be getting out, of London.
 
 Research
 However insightful the visits are, and however eloquent are the representatives of
particular interest groups, it has been essential for the Commission to have
dispassionate, representative evidence as well. For each report it has carried out its
own postal surveys, with the assistance of trade associations, to elicit responses from
many thousand affected employers about the impact of, and their response to,
increases in the Minimum Wage. More important, the Commission has become a
major commissioner of research. This has ranged from case study fieldwork, through
sampled surveys, to the detailed analysis of existing data sources. In all 74 distinct
research projects have been commissioned since 1999, and their findings are
summarised in Commission reports. Another round is being competed for at the time
of writing. For this work the Commission has been very fortunate in being able to
enlist both leading labour market research firms and internationally outstanding
industrial sociologists and labour economists. Indeed, it is hard to think of a ‘natural
experiment’ in the social sciences that has received closer academic attention than the
introduction of the UK’s National Minimum Wage, and our understanding of the low
paid end of the labour market has improved substantially as a result.
 
 The nature of the research programme has changed as the Wage has settled in. The
initial concern was with the immediate impact. Appropriate ‘before and after’ studies
were necessarily constrained by the recency of the event. But if quantitative time-
series analyses were not yet possible, more qualitative case study approaches came
into their own, while memories of initial adjustments to the Wage were fresh. Much
of this work was by people with industrial relations research backgrounds, with their
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familiarity with interview and case study techniques to explore changing power
relationships. Studies were carried out on selected affected sectors (clothing,
hospitality, charities, retail, hairdressing, and horse racing, for example) and on
selected vulnerable groups, such as young workers, ethnic minorities, people with
disabilities, students, rural communities, and employees in small firms. A variety of
surveys were conducted, some building fruitfully on existing survey vehicles to detect
changing behaviour. Of great value at this stage were studies carried out (with
secretariat guidance) by pressure groups and voluntary organisations with unique
access to their membership. Citizens Advice Bureaux, which deal with hundreds of
thousands of employment rights cases each year, carried out valuable studies of their
own casebooks on initial awareness and the impact of the Wage. Other groups
contributing included local government researchers, local Low Pay Units, and
organisations concerned with home-workers, the voluntary sector, and with gender
equality. More recently qualitative, case study based approaches have been focussed
on very specific policy concerns of the Commission, such as training, enforcement,
non-compliance, and the employment of 16 and 17 year olds.
 
 The passage of time since the introduction of the Minimum Wage has brought an
ever-growing mass of relevant data from a variety of statistically representative
surveys. This has brought leading labour market econometricians into the search, with
the means to put ‘before and after’ studies on a sound statistical footing. A
particularly potent technique has been the comparison of some aspect of the
experience of workers who have been directly affected by the Wage with that of
slightly better paid workers, not directly affected, but statistically matched in all other
measured characteristics. Recently commissioned econometric studies have explored,
among other things, effects of the Minimum Wage on employment, productivity,
profitability, the number of hours worked, second job holding, movements in and out
of employment, movements in and out of the Minimum Wage, and also the household
characteristics of the beneficiaries.
 
 All this work is building up a picture of the impact of the Minimum Wage of growing
reliability. It is one of substantial impact, in terms of the numbers of workers affected
directly, intermittently, or indirectly. The beneficiaries may not be their household’s
main income earner, but they are concentrated in the poorest working-age households.
Exhaustive enquiry has still failed to give any evidence of adverse employment
effects on either primary or secondary jobs. But there is some evidence that, in the
service sector, job creation may have been hampered by the Minimum Wage, and it
may have led to a slight reduction in working hours. Steering, as the Commissioners
must, in a blizzard of anecdotes and speculation, it is hard to exaggerate the guiding
value of this growing body of research.
 
 Institutional lessons
 What wider lessons for labour market regulation might be learnt from the early years
of the Low Pay Commission? The National Minimum Wage is a major and apparently
effective labour market intervention that has been established with little resistance.
The Commission itself has developed a social partnership approach that has won
agreement on all aspects of the Minimum Wage, most notably on its level. Its
recommendations have been accepted by government, with the trivial exception of
whether entitlement to the full rate should start at 21 or 22 years of age. What might
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account for this apparent success? Are there wider lessons for the national regulation
of labour standards?
 
There are six main features of the Commission that have helped its work. One is that
it is a single-issue, and in some ways a simple-issue body.  The implied aim of the
National Minimum Wage is that it should be an intervention that makes a positive
difference to low-paid workers’ pay up to a point where it still does not jeopardise
their jobs. This is an aim with which all Commissioners can readily identify.
Second, the Commission is sufficiently small for the Commissioners to be able to
work closely together, especially through the difficult process of achieving agreement
on the recommended level for the Minimum Wage. Regular consultative visits have
been important in helping them build close working relationships with each other and
with their secretariat.
These consultations are a third important feature. Meeting people throughout Britain
who have to work with the consequences of the Commission’s deliberations is a
fruitful and chastening experience. It probably helps the political acceptability of the
Minimum Wage. It certainly helps to keep the Commissioners’ feet on the sometimes
grim and shifting ground.
However rich the insights gained from consultation, they rarely swing arguments.
This is why emphasis must be placed on the fourth feature of the Commission’s work:
research. Time and again disagreements within the Commission have been resolved
by some research on a point of controversy, often no more than a simple
quantification. The labour market is so variable, so perverse, so confused, and so
subject to myth-making, that without the back-up of sound empirical research, neither
the Commissioners, nor the Government, could be confident about the Minimum
Wage’s effects.  Research is the best antidote to myth.
Research is also an important buttress of the fifth feature: the Commission’s success
in keeping the Government at arm’s length. The Commission has now steered the
Minimum Wage through the political perils of two general election campaigns.
Whether or not all politicians respect research, their civil servants generally do, and
the Minimum Wage is research led policy par excellence. Whatever the temptation
for Government to exercise influence other than through formal evidence, no attempt
has been made to do so.
Sixth, is the importance of enforcement. Employers comply more willingly if they can
be reassured that they will not be undercut by non-compliant competitors. In the
Revenue, the Commission has an enforcer with immense relevant experience. It may
not be fully successful in the shadows of the black economy, but it is energetic,
ingenious, and generally respected.
These features may have wider applicability for labour market regulatory institutions
in the twenty-first century: to be small, focused, independent, research active, and to
get out and about and talk with, and learn from, the affected public. But uniquely for
the British context it is the sixth feature, access to effective enforcement, which is
perhaps the most unusual source of strength for the Low Pay Commission.
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Over the past thirty years successive British governments have introduced several
score statutory labour standards – concerned with equality and fairness of treatment
by employers, with parental rights, working hours, working safety, and much else
besides. But with the exception of the Minimum Wage, and to some extent health and
safety, all these rely on do-it-yourself enforcement. It is up to the aggrieved worker to
press for his or her statutory individual employment rights. Indeed, it is the
employee’s entitlement not only to take such a grievance to an Employment Tribunal,
but also to have an Acas conciliator intercede and try to reach a settlement. But in
practice these are hollow rights for those with greatest need. For these are the most
vulnerable in the workforce, the majority of whom have neither trade union
representation nor the self-confidence to challenge their employer.
Almost all other countries have independent labour inspectorates that, to a greater or
lesser extent, seek out employers who breach statutory labour standards, and take up
cases on behalf of aggrieved employees. Britain’s labour market regulation is
defective in this respect. The Low Pay Commission’s most fundamental lesson for
Britain’s other regulatory institutions may be the importance of independent
enforcement. Can a statutory right be considered truly universal without it? If not,
then the National Minimum Wage is arguably Britain’s only effective labour standard.
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